We report strong empirical support for the presence of a risk-sharing motive of withinfamily monetary ‡ows. A standard model of risk-sharing predicts that the share of current family income consumed by a child positively depends on that child's lifetime contribution to the present value of the total family income. Therefore, sensitivity of transfer receipts to ‡uctuations in recipient's current income is smaller for children who contribute more. We test this distinguishing prediction of the risk-sharing model by exploiting the observed variation of parental transfers to siblings over 17 years in a longitudinal dataset derived from the Health and Retirement Study.
Introduction
The allocation of risk within economic groups has long been a topic of interest for economists. While the development literature has widely accepted the role of families as risk-sharing units (e.g., Townsend 1994) , most macroeconomic models leave out motives for intended (inter vivos) transfers, despite their substantial size.
It is, however, important to understand the role of these transfers in facilitating risk-sharing among family members (parental and adult children's households), if the goal is to design e¤ective social insurance or welfare programs or to understand aggregate patterns driven by lifecycle behavior of individual agents.
In fact, several macroeconomic studies assign a signi…cant role to within-family giving in accounting for aggregate patterns. De Nardi (2004) and Nishiyama (2002) , for example, demonstrate that allowing for intergenerational links in a lifecycle model improves the ability of the model to …t the observed wealth distribution. Kotliko¤ and Summers (1981) and Munnell and Sunden (2003) document that intergenerational transfers account for a major part of capital formation. Weil (1994) estimates the response of consumption to inheritance, which is manifested in lower savings rates by the working-age population in countries with older populations, and argues that it explains the puzzling empirical fact that countries with older populations tend to save less, despite the micro evidence pointing to the lack of signi…cant dissaving by the elderly. 1 In this paper, we test for the presence of the risk-sharing motive of giving using a novel child-level longitudinal dataset, which we construct based on all of the available waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and augment with detailed parental information. We review a textbook model of risksharing (Krueger, 2012) , which predicts that children always consume a constant share ( j ) of total family resources, and this consumption share is given by the child's expected lifetime contribution to total family resources. It follows that transfer amount responds negatively to the recipient's current income, and most importantly, the magnitude of this response depends negatively on j . In other words, a child with a larger permanent contribution to total family income will receive less compensation for the same temporary drop in income when compared to a child whose contribution is smaller, simply because he is a¤ected more by the corresponding drop in family income. To test this prediction, we focus on families with at least two children, and exploit the observed variation across transfer amounts received by siblings. We …nd strong empirical support for the presence of risk-sharing between parental and adult children's households.
Since the dataset that we construct is the most comprehensive dataset of within-family giving in the U.S., we also report detailed summary statistics on child-to-parent and parent-to-child transfer incidence and magnitude, which we expect to prove useful in calibrations of macroeconomic models that incorporate giving. Other transfer studies based on all nine waves of HRS are Leukhina and Santoro (2011) and McGarry (2012) , both of which explore the dynamic aspects of giving. The latter work emphasizes that controlling for the unobservable di¤erences, which is what the panel dimension allows us to do, makes an important di¤erence in estimating the e¤ects of income on transfer amounts.
Consistent with previous studies, we …nd that intra-family transfers are signi…cant in their incidence 1 Also see Bosworth et al., 2004. and that, on average, they ‡ow downward, from parents to children. In each wave, which represents every two years during the period 1992-2008, roughly 20 percent of non-coresident children received a transfer, the average amount of which was about $8,700. 2 However, only about 2 percent of children in any given wave are reported to give money to the parents, with the average amount of that transfer around $4,000.
Nearly half of the children are recorded receiving a transfer from their parents at some point during the time period they are present in the survey, the average magnitude of the total transfer is nearly $20,000.
Therefore, downward ‡ows are substantial in magnitude and incidence. On the contrary, only 8 percent of children report giving a transfer to the parents at some point during the survey, with the average magnitude of the total transfer at $5,700. Therefore, the upward transfers are much less frequent and smaller in magnitude. In fact, the incidence of parent-to-child transfer is approximately 6 times greater than the incidence of the child-to-parent transfer.
We also document that parents give more when children are younger, when the children's borrowing constraints are presumably tighter. Children in lower income classes are more likely to receive parental transfers, whereas wealthier and older parents tend to give more frequently and in greater amounts.
Importantly, we emphasize that our dynamic test is based on the prediction unique to the model of risk-sharing, and not shared by the model of altruistic giving. Put di¤erently, we provide evidence for the presence of the risk-sharing motive of giving, which cannot be interpreted as evidence for altruistic giving. Brie ‡y, both the risk-sharing and the altruistic frameworks share many predictions, in particular, they both imply that children consume a constant share of family income, which in turn, dampens the magnitude of transfer amount response to temporary income ‡uctuations. However, the risk-sharing framework alone links the consumption shares to children's permanent contributions to their family resources. Therefore, by uncovering signi…cant in ‡uence of children's permanent contributions on their transfer responsiveness to current income, we provide evidence which is unique to the presence of the risk-sharing motive.
Our paper contributes to the strand of literature that attempts to uncover the motives underlying within-family transfer ‡ows. In general, parental giving to children can be classi…ed into inter vivos ‡ows and bequests. Although bequests can be both accidental and intended (i.e. voluntary), inter vivos ‡ows are clearly intended. In this paper, we focus solely on inter vivos ‡ows. 3 The standard explanations for these ‡ows are based on the altruistic motive, the risk-sharing motive, the exchange motive (e.g. help provision for money). 4 Our goal is to test for the presence of the risk-sharing motive of giving, although not at the expense of the other motives. In fact, we estimate a variant of our empirical test which recognizes the presence of the exchange motive by controlling for help provision (children or grandchildren providing help or paying for it). Norton and Van Houtven (2006) provides evidence for the exchange motive based on the AHEAD data (a subset of our dataset), where it is found that, conditional on giving, parents give more to children who provide more care.
Likewise, several papers tested for the altruistic motive of giving. McGarry (1999) …nds support for altruistic giving based on a model that includes uncertainty about the recipient's permanent income.
However, Altonji et al. (1992) and Altonji et al. (1997) both reject the altruistic motive of giving.
Because the altruistic and risk-sharing models share many of their predictions, it is important for us to clarify that our risk-sharing test is valid in the context of these previous …ndings. See Section 2.3 for a detailed discussion of these papers.
Our study also contributes to the literature that documents ‡ows of within-family giving, although we focus solely on inter vivos giving. Our contribution to this strand of literature is that we construct a comprehensive longitudinal child-level dataset of within-family giving, based on nine waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) which covers eighteen consecutive years. We augment it with detailed information on transfer ‡ows to and from children, help provision and frequency of contact variables, and detailed parental information contained in the RAND HRS dataset. We use this dataset to document descriptive statistics regarding the magnitude and direction of intergenerational ‡ows. Earlier contributions to this strand of the literature include Gale and Scholz (1994) , which, based on Survey of Consumer Finances data for [1983] [1984] [1985] , report that intended transfers and bequests account for roughly half of net worth accumulation, bequests accounting for twenty percent. Cox (1990) …nds that transfers depend negatively on recipient's current income, and positively on donor's income and on recipient's permanent income. Dunn and Phillips (1997) document that while inter vivos transfers are given to children with less income, bequests are divided between children equally, independent of their income. 5
McGarry (1999) employs the original 1992 HRS and Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest-Old (1993 AHEAD) to document similar transfer magnitudes to ours.
To sum up, we construct a comprehensive longitudinal dataset of within-family giving and document inter vivos transfer ‡ows. Then, based on the unique prediction of a standard dynamic risk-sharing framework, we derive a dynamic empirical speci…cation, which allows us to test for the presence of risksharing within families. We …nd strong support for the presence of the risk-sharing motive of giving.
We organize the paper as follows. In Section 2, we review the standard risk-sharing and altruistic frameworks and characterize their solutions. We derive the unique prediction of the risk-sharing model which is not shared by the altruistic framework. In Section 3, we introduce the new dataset and present facts on the incidence and extent of monetary transfers in our data. In Section 4, we present our methodology to test for the presence of the risk-sharing motive of giving. We present our results in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
Theoretical Background
Our goal is to investigate the risk-sharing motive of giving. However, since the risk sharing and the altruistic frameworks share many of the same predictions, it is useful to review both frameworks. In this section, we derive explicitly the unique prediction of the risk-sharing model, which is not shared by the altruistic framework. This prediction forms the basis for our empirical speci…cation, employed to test for the presence of the risk-sharing motive of within-family ‡ows.
Within-family risk-sharing
Parents and children can be linked through risk-sharing arrangements. Kotliko¤ and Spivak (1981) is a seminal work describing how intra-family arrangements can substitute for imperfect annuity markets, even in the absence of altruistic behavior. As in insurance markets, family members can set up contracts that discipline risk-sharing arrangements. Presumably, enforceability and adverse selection issues are easily resolved within families, in contrast to formal insurance markets.
Suppose that parent and adult child overlap for T periods and face random income. In any given date t, one of the following events can be realized s t 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg ; each occurring with probability (s t ) ; 
e. the ratio of consumption between the two agents is constant over time and across event histories. It follows that, for every event history, agent i consumes a constant share i of total family endowment under that event history. The proposition below formalizes this result and establishes that agents' consumption shares are given by their expected lifetime contribution to family resources.
Proposition 1 Assume u = log c it s t : Then agent i 2 fk; pg consumes a constant share of total family endowment
where the consumption share i is given by the present value of his expected lifetime contribution to family resources:
Proof. See the appendix.
In other words, the larger is the child's permanent contribution to family resources, the larger share of resources he consumes under any given event history. Hence, for the risk-sharing model under the assumption of perfect commitment and no information frictions, the optimal parent-to-child transfer, which we denote by T R, is given by
Clearly, k mitigates the e¤ect of current income ‡uctuations on the current transfer, a larger k making transfers less sensitive to temporary income ‡uctuations. Intuitively, a relatively wealthy child (high k ) will be compensated less for temporary drops in income because he is a¤ected more by the corresponding temporary drop in total family resources. It can be formally derived that the derivative of child transfer with respect to child income is negative but positively depends on k , i.e.
This model easily extends to the environment with J children, in which we index children by j; j 2 f1; 2; :::Jg. Similar to the single child case, each child is entitled to a …xed fraction of the current total family endowment, given by the share of total resources that he contributes
where the share is given by
The optimal transfer to child j is therefore
Clearly, j mitigates the e¤ect of current income ‡uctuations on the current transfer. This constitutes the essence of our empirical test for the risk sharing motive of giving. The extension to multiple children allows for the intuitive across children interpretation. The permanently "rich" and "poor" children will be compensated unevenly for the same drop in their current income. The "rich" child will receive less compensation, because he is a¤ected more by the corresponding drop in total family resources. Similarly, the "rich" child will experience a smaller decline in the transfer received in the case of a rise in current income, because he bene…ts more from the corresponding rise in total family resources.
Altruistic framework
The altruistic motive is probably the most prominent in the literature of within-family giving, dating to Becker (1974) . Consider the following model of one parent and one child. The parent maximizes his utility, which includes the utility of his child weighted by : For simplicity, there is no borrowing or lending. As in the risk sharing model, parent and child overlap for T periods and face a random income process. The notation is as above. The solution involves equalizing marginal utilities for the parent and child, as well as setting the marginal rate of substitution of consumption across periods equal to the interest rate (i.e. consumption smoothing across time). In fact, with log utility assumed above, we will have
c kt s
It is straightforward to see that children will receive greater transfers under event histories that imply low income realizations ( @T Rt(s t ) @y kt (s t ) < 0). Parents will give more in periods in which their incomes are high ( @T Rt(s t ) @ypt(s t ) > 0), in particular in periods in which their incomes are higher than their children's. The altruistic model presented above easily extends to the environment with multiple children. In this set-up, it is easy to show that the share of each child's consumption in total family income is …xed and is independent of date and state. Also, this share decreases as the number of children increases.
Proposition 2 Given t and s t , the share of total family income consumed by a child is a decreasing function of the number of children (J) in the family:
Proof. See the appendix. 6 Since the parent can choose a negative transfer, we want to make sure the child will not prefer autarky to this altruistic arrangement, i.e., that
implied by the parent's optimal choice is greater or equal to
Discussion
Note that at the …rst glance, the risk-sharing model and the pure altruistic model predict identical consumption allocations and transfers. To see that, compare (4) with (8). We see that j in the risk sharing model corresponds to 1+ J in the altruistic model. The distinguishing prediction of the risk-sharing model, however, is that the child's consumption share, j ; is determined by that child's permanent contribution to family income, while the consumption share in the altruistic model, 1+ J ; is determined by the deep parameters of the model, i.e. utility weights that parents assign to their children. Therefore, while in both models, children's consumption shares govern the response of their transfer amounts to income ‡uctuations, only in the risk-sharing model this response depends on the child's permanent contribution to family income. This distinguishing feature of the risk-sharing model is the essence of our empirical test. The detailed discussion of our methodology follows in Section 4.
Previous literature has focused on tests of altruistic giving. Since both frameworks share many predictions, a brief discussion, or rather, a defense against previous rejections of the altruistic giving, is in order.
The prediction of constant consumption shares, implied by both frameworks, has been rejected by Altonji et al. (1992) based on food consumption data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
In this regard, the model needs to be modi…ed to produce a more realistic prediction. Altonji et al. (1997) , for example, modi…es the standard model of altruism to include uncertainty over child's income pro…les, which induces parents to delay transfers. However, whatever modi…cations are introduced, the distinguishing prediction of the risk-sharing model tested here, i.e. whether transfer sensitivity depends on one's contribution to total family resources, is bound to survive. The reason for this is that the distinguishing prediction will hold as long as one's contribution to family resources a¤ects one's claim to those resources. Altonji et al. (1997) uses transfer amounts reported in the PSID to test another prediction of the altruistic model. Precisely, they test whether an increase in the income of the parent associated with the same decrease in the income of the child raises the child's transfer by the same amount, thus keeping the child's consumption …xed. Algebraically, this means that the di¤erence in the partial derivatives of the transfer with respect to the parent's income and the child's income should equal one. The authors …nd that the di¤erence is much lower in the data (about 0.13). Our risk-sharing model gives us a closed-form solution for this di¤erence in partial derivatives. Indeed, we …nd that our risk-sharing model delivers a di¤erential that is less than one, which is consistent with the …ndings in Altonji et al. (1997) . To see this, consider the version of the model with one child given in Section 2.1. The consumption share of the child is given by equation (2) while his transfer receipt is given by equation (3) : It follows that
McGarry (2012) modi…es the altruistic model in Altonji et al. (1997) to allow for the distribution of the child's second period income to depend on his income in the …rst period, and shows that the derivative restriction tested in Altonji et al. (1997) need not hold, in particular, it can take a value between zero and one.
Data
The The study contains detailed information on the demographics, health status, housing, family structure and transfer ‡ows, employment status, work history and current employment, disability, retirement plans, wealth, wealth composition, income, and health and life insurance, and intended bequests. Table 1 summarizes the age distribution of the head of the household (respondent), by wave. We proceed as follows. For each wave, we start with raw household-member …les that include information on adult children and enrich them with relevant information inferred from helper-level and transfer-level …les. As is customary, we merge the 1993 AHEAD study with 1994 HRS study into wave 2 and the 1995 AHEAD study with 1996 HRS into wave 3. We then merge wave-speci…c child-level …les together to create a longitudinal dataset, using the appropriate household and person identi…ers. Finally, we merge the resulting child-level dataset with the RAND HRS data …le (version J), which contains detailed parental information. 8
Household-member …les (or child-level …les for earlier waves) contain information regarding children's characteristics, such as family income, education, age, number of own children, frequency of contact with parents. Limited information is also available for children's spouses, such as their employment status. Monetary transfer ‡ows are identi…ed between a given child's family and the respondent's family. To keep our analysis more tractable and make it less prone to error, we focus on respondent households (parents) that did not change their subhousehold identi…er throughout the period examined, i.e.
households that did not split due to divorce in the period they were surveyed. This restriction eliminates only 7 percent of households, as the likelihood of divorce is relatively low at older ages.
Child family income is inferred as the midpoint of the reported interval. To be consistent across waves, we work with 5 income values: 5,000, 22,500, 52,500, 85,000, 105,000. 11 Because the precise measure of child family income is not available, we are not able to obtain the estimate for @T R j =@y j . However, what we are interested in estimating is simply whether or not this derivative depends on the child's contribution to the total permanent income of the extended family, i.e. the risk-sharing unit.
We translate all monetary values, except for the income mid into 2008 dollars using CPI index.
We restrict our attention to adult children of ages [18, 55) . We report summary statistics for the resulting dataset. For regression analysis, we restrict attention to risk-sharing units with at least two adult children and appearing in at least two waves. The former restriction is needed for the presence of variation across siblings, and the latter ensures that the longitudinal dimension can be exploited. 9 The two questions identifying transfers to children are as follows. Including help with education but not shared housing or shared food [or any deed to a house], since previous wave [or in the past two years] did you [or your {late} husband/wife/partner/ ] give …nancial help totaling $500 or more to a child [or her/his children/grandchildren]? About how much did that amount to for [a given child] since the previous wave/in the last two years? For the …rst two waves, transfer ‡ows over the past 12 months are recorded, and only if they are over $100. For consistency with other waves, we multiply those amounts by 2. The two questions identifying transfers from children are similar. 1 0 When the exact transfer amount is unavailable, a bracket containing it is reported. We …ll in the unavailable amounts with imputed values from transfer imputation …les, available for all waves except the last two. For those waves, we impute the exact amount as the wave-speci…c average among transfers within the same bracket.
1 1 These values represent income values we choose to refer to the intervals reported for the HRS cohort of wave 3: < 10; 000; [10; 000; 35; 000); [35000; 70000); [70; 000; 100; 000); 100; 000: Whenever income imputations are available (waves 2 and 3), we assign the income midpoint according to the bracket implied by the imputed value. For waves 4 -9, the last two brackets are merged into one, > 70; 000: We treat this bracket as a closed bracket [70; 000; 100; 000); therefore assigning the value of 85,000 to children in that bracket. This assumption is rather innocuous, since only 3 percent of children in waves 2 and 3 fall into the highest bracket 100; 000: Finally, the AHEAD cohort of wave 2 is missing information on child family income, instead reporting child income. Finally, wave 1, gives limited brackets, therefore we only use information from people falling into the …rst two brackets, for consistency. We also checked that our results are robust to excluding wave 1 from our analysis.
Summary Statistics
Before proceeding to estimate the empirical model, we brie ‡y summarize the data. To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst dataset that uses all waves of the HRS to study parental transfers to children. Table 2 summarizes transfer ‡ow frequency and magnitude. In our dataset, the average number of waves any given child is present is 5.11. The reason is simple. The dataset is being extended every year, so new entrants appear in every wave. Nearly half of the children present are recorded receiving a transfer from their parents at some point during the time period surveyed, the average magnitude of the total transfer is nearly $20,000. Therefore, downward ‡ows are substantial in magnitude and incidence. On the contrary, only 8 percent of children report ever giving a transfer to the parents, with the average magnitude of the total transfer at $5,697. Therefore, the upward transfers are much less frequent and smaller in magnitude. In fact, the incidence of parent-to-child transfer is approximately 6 (=0.47/0.08) times greater than the incidence of the child-to-parent transfer. For the remainder of this section, we treat a child in a given wave as a unit of observation, e¤ectively pooling child-level data across all waves. Table 3 reports summary statistics by wave, 1992, 1994,..., 2008. Recall that all dollar amounts are quoted in 2000 dollars and transfer amounts refer to the period elapsed since the previous wave. The table reveals that transfer ‡ows from parents to children are substantial in size, even at wave level frequency. Every wave, around 20 percent of children receive a transfer in the period elapsed since the previous wave, the average amount of which is $8,717. There appears no trend in frequency or magnitude of giving over time, despite the fact that the mean child age changes from 30 in the …rst wave to 39 in the last wave. The summary statistics also display that very few children, only 2 percent, help their parents with their daily tasks. Only 4 percent of children that help get paid for their help. In other words, children receive substantial amounts of money from the parents despite the fact they do not help. Approximately 2 percent of children are reported giving money to the parents in any given wave, with the average amount of transfer around $4,047. Table 4 reports transfer ‡ows by child's age. The probability of receiving a transfer declines with age, in a convex-like manner, with transfer incidence dropping quickly at early ages, and slowly for older ages. If we report the same statistics but for strictly non-student children, the incidence of transfers by age groups looks very similar, except the amount for the youngest group is about $3,000 less, while the incidence for that group is lower by about 3 percent. There is a strong association of transfer ‡ows and parental wealth. As reported in Table 5, children with richer parents receive greater transfer amounts. In any given wave, nearly 40 percent of children whose parental assets are in the top decile receive a transfer, of around $16,000 in magnitude, both of these quantities are nearly twice the size of the average incidence and magnitude. The asset value of the top decile is signi…cantly greater than the value of the assets in the second decile, consistent with the large wealth inequality present in the U.S. This observation may explain why the probability of giving a child a transfer and its average amount rises most sharply as we move from the 9 th to the 10 th (top)
decile of parental wealth. The incidence of transfers to parents declines in parental wealth level, but the amount conditional on giving rises. Finally, in Table 6 , we report transfer ‡ows by child household's income. Note the average numbers change slightly because family income category is not available for every child in the dataset. To summarize statistics here, we merge together the top two income intervals, because only 1 percent of child-wave units are in the top income category (>100,000). The probability of getting a transfer from the parents declines with the child's income category. The probability of giving to one's parents rises only very slightly with the child's income class. Note that the incidence of transfer received and the average amount of these transfers drops most signi…cantly when children move from the …rst income class to the second. An interesting pattern emerges for the parent-to-child transfers when comparing income categories 2, 3, and 4: although the incidence of receiving a parental transfer declines, the amount of transfer, conditional on receipt, increases with the child's income category. This pattern is not inconsistent with the risk-sharing arrangement discussed in Section 2. When a negative …nancial shock hits a child family in the highest income category, which can proxy for the permanent income, the amount of payment that a risk-sharing contract may also be high, if his extended family's total resources are higher than those of children in lower income categories. 
Methods
The risk-sharing framework, and in particular the parent-to-child optimal transfer (6), motivates the following empirical speci…cation, which we estimate using longitudinal child-level data:
The child transfer at time t depends on child family's current income, its interaction with the estimate of child's i , time dependent child family characteristics, time dependent characteristics of extended family, and child family …xed e¤ects (fe i ), and time e¤ects ( t ). The panel dimension allows us to control for unobserved factors that vary across children but are …xed over time. Child …xed e¤ects will capture the in ‡uence on transfer ‡ows of factors that tend to be …xed over time, such as child's relationship with his/her parents, frequency of contact between them and proximity of residency, etc. Certainly, frequency of contact and geographical proximity may change over time, but information on these two quantities is not consistently available across waves. 12 Therefore, we choose not to include these variables among child time dependent characteristics.
Among child family time dependent characteristics, we include the number of own children and whether or not a child or an immediate member of his family are listed in the helper-level …les as helpers, regardless of whether or not they received compensation for their help directly.
Extended family refers to the child's parents and siblings'households. Precisely, our risk-sharing model suggests that transfers positively depend on the total amount of resources available to the risk-sharing unit, multiplied by theta. We arrive at this measure by multiplying our measure of i by the sum of current parental income and current incomes of child's and his siblings'families. We also include parental total wealth among extended family characteristics. Our rationale for this inclusion is that parental wealth will help improve the proxy for total available resources. 13 Finally, we include retirement status for the parental household, which we de…ne as an indicator that parental household earnings are below $1,000.
The child and time …xed e¤ects model is estimated by including wave dummies ( t ) on the right hand side of (9) : Time e¤ects would capture omitted variables that vary over time but not across individuals, such as, for example, changes in estate tax laws, which are likely to in ‡uence inter vivos transfer ‡ows.
A Proxy for i
For the empirical analysis, we need to approximate the empirical counterpart of i , de…ned in (2) ; i.e. child i's contribution to the expected value of total resources available to the risk-sharing unit. We consider the risk-sharing unit the network of parental household and its adult children's households, with eligible adult children de…ned to be between the ages of eighteen and …fty …ve. As already explained above, in order to take advantage of variation of transfers received by siblings, we restrict attention to risk-sharing units with at least two eligible adult children, who appear in at least two waves. On average, a unique child is present in 5.3 waves of the surveys, i.e. about 12 years.
To approximate i , we …rst compute the child's contribution to total family resources in each wave, i.e.^ it = y it = (y 1t + y 2t + ::: + y Jt + y pt ) : We then average these quantities over the waves in which the child is present,^ i = P T t=1^ it : The average^ in the sample is 0.16, and its distribution is depicted in the histogram below. In Section 5, an adjusted measure of i is also explored. Table A1 in the appendix contains the main estimation results. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Main Results
Our main objective is to test for the presence of in ‡uence of^ i , our measure of the child's contribution to the risk-sharing unit's permanent resources, on the derivative @T R it =@y it . According to the risk-sharing model outlined in Section 2.1, this derivative is negative, but it depends positively on i . Therefore, the risk-sharing motive of giving implies that 1 < 0 and 2 > 0: Table 1 reports estimations for …ve di¤erent speci…cations. We reject the null hypotheses that 1 = 0 and 2 = 0 against their respective alternatives, that 1 < 0 and 2 > 0 at 0.5% signi…cance level across all …ve speci…cations.
The …rst speci…cation is the most parsimonious one. It excludes the time e¤ects, and time dependent child and extended family characteristics:
As expected, we estimate a negative coe¢ cient on child's income (-0.0398) and a positive coe¢ cient on the interaction term^ i y it (0.0857). Note that since the average^ is 0.16, the estimated total e¤ect of child's income on the transfer received for a person with an average^ is negative, 0:0398+0:0857 (0:16) = 0:026: The null hypotheses that 1 = 0 and 2 = 0 are rejected against their respective alternatives, that 1 < 0 and 2 > 0; at 0.5% signi…cance level.
This results in a slightly higher estimate of 2 ; but both null hypotheses are still rejected at 0.5% signi…cance level. The last three speci…cations exclude the time e¤ects, but include time dependent child and other family's characteristics. The third speci…cation includes child's number of children, the estimate on which is positive and highly signi…cant. It also includes parental wealth, the coe¢ cient on which is also positive and signi…cant. With the inclusion of total parental wealth, the number of observations goes down, because total parental assets are unavailable in Wave 3. If we work with parental …nancial assets, information on which is available in all waves, our main results are not a¤ected much. The forth speci…cation generalizes the third speci…cation by also including the interaction term of^ with the total income of other members of the risk-sharing unit, the coe¢ cient on which is estimated to be positive, consistent with the implication of the model, although it is not highly signi…cant. It also includes the dummy for retirement of both parents, which is not found to be a signi…cant determinant of child transfers.
Finally, the …fth speci…cation generalizes the forth speci…cation by including the helper dummy, which
indicates whether or not a child, or any of his children, provided physical help (or paid for a hired helper)
to the parents. Inclusion of this variable controls for the potential presence of the exchange motive of giving upheld by Norton and Van Houtven (2006) . Including the help provision variable reduces the number of the observations e¤ectively used in the regression because help information is not available in Wave 1. In each of the last three speci…cations, which control for time dependent characteristics, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term rises to 0.12. The main result is that across all speci…cations, we …nd that coe¢ cient on child family current income is highly signi…cant and negative, while the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is highly signi…cant and positive. This result provides empirical support for the hypothesis that @T R it =@y it depends positively on the child's contribution to the aggregate resources, therefore lending support to the risk-sharing motive of giving.
Di¤erentiating the Risk-Sharing Motive from the Altruistic Motive
Recall that both the altruistic and risk-sharing models imply that di¤erential consumption shares across children explain variation of derivatives @T R j =@y j across children, although di¤erential consumption shares arise for di¤erent reasons. To di¤erentiate the implications of the two models, it is useful to consider the case of the altruistic model where parents care equally for all of its adult children. In that case, as can be seen from (2), adult children with just two other siblings would have an entitlement weight of 1/3. Adult children with 3 siblings would have an entitlement weight of 1/4. The altruistic model then implies that consumption shares are …xed across siblings, and even across unrelated children that have the same number of siblings. In contrast, the risk sharing model implies that consumption shares vary both across siblings and across unrelated children, and links them to children's contribution to their family's total resources.
In fact, because the number of siblings also matters for consumption shares in the risk-sharing model (a child making a …xed salary every period will be entitled to a larger share of total family resources if he comes from a smaller family), our measure of theta,^ i , will duly correlate with family size, and therefore with consumption shares predicted by the altruistic model. In order to distinguish between the two models, or in other words, to be able to claim that the empirical evidence we …nd is uniquely consistent with the risk-sharing model, we need to eliminate family size e¤ects from the variation of^ i .
To do this, we apply two di¤erent methods. First, we split the main sample into samples of children with a …xed number of siblings, and reestimate the main model on each subsample. Second, we reestimate the …ve speci…cations from Table A1 on the entire sample, but use an estimate^ i adjusted by family size.
Precisely, the adjusted^ i captures child i's contribution to family income relative to the average (not aggregate) contribution of his siblings.
Results obtained by applying the …rst method are reported in Table A2 . Since restricting the main sample to subsamples de…ned by the number of adult children in the risk sharing unit substantially reduces the number of observations, we do not estimate the time e¤ects, and among the time-dependent characteristics, we include only those that we found to be signi…cant (except helper dummies, which is not available in Wave 1). These characteristics are parental assets and children's number of children. We report the results for subsamples of children with up to 6 other siblings. Once again, we see strong evidence for the risk sharing motive, even though variation of theta due to family size is eliminated. Coe¢ cient estimate on the current child family income is negative and statistically signi…cant (p-value<0.01), while the coe¢ cient estimate on the interaction term is positive and statistically signi…cant, with the p-value below 0.05 for all subsamples, and below 0.01 for half of the subsamples.
Results obtained from the second method are reported in Table A3 . We reestimate the …ve speci…cations, discussed in Table A1 , on the entire sample, but use a measure of^ i ; which is adjusted by family size. None of the main conclusions are a¤ected. In fact, the point estimates are very close to those reported in Table A1 , with an exception of^ 2 , which changes to accommodate the adjustment in the multiplier on child's income (from^ to^ adj ). Our present attempts to eliminate family size e¤ects should not be misinterpreted. We emphasize that family size e¤ects are very important determinants of child consumption shares in the model of risk-sharing, and consequently they are important determinants of transfer sensitivity to child income ‡uctuations. We aim to eliminate family e¤ects here because its in ‡uence on transfer sensitivity is shared by the altruistic framework, and our goal is to test whether or not transfer sensitivity is a¤ected by factors unique to the risk sharing framework. By eliminating family size e¤ects, we test for the in ‡uence of child's income pro…le (relative to the rest of his family) on the derivative @T R j =@y j , present in the risk-sharing model, but not in the altruistic model.
Conclusions
One goal of this study is to extensively characterize intergenerational ‡ows in the U.S. To this end, we constructed a novel child-level longitudinal dataset based on the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) …les. Consistent with previous studies, we document that intra-family transfers are signi…cant in their incidence and that, by and large, they ‡ow downward, from parents to children. In each wave of the HRS, roughly 20 percent of non-coresident children received a transfer, the average amount of which was about $8,700. Moreover, nearly half of the children present in our dataset are recorded receiving a transfer from their parents at some point during the time period surveyed, the total transfer amount averaging around $20,000. Note that these children are observed for an average of around 10 years. By restricting attention to children observed for more than a single wave, or even further, total transfer amount would increase substantially.
Based on the transfer record data, we …nd strong support for the presence of the risk-sharing motive within extended families in the U.S. This evidence complements development literature, which …nds support for the risk-sharing motive within communities, and is based on consumption data. Furthermore, we identify a feature of optimal transfers that is unique to the risk-sharing motive, and is not shared by the altruistic model. Speci…cally, the risk-sharing framework links the children's consumption shares to their permanent contributions to the family resources; but the altruistic framework does not. This prediction enables us to design a dynamic empirical speci…cation which exploits the observed variation across parental transfers to siblings and provides a unique test for the presence of risk-sharing. We …nd strong empirical support for the risk-sharing motive of giving. Note that child j consumes a …xed share of total family income and this share is decreasing in J. 
